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court 0 would place the burden of proof on the teacher and would re-
spect nonrenewal decisions based upon minimal factual support and
subtle reasoning. As such, these procedures would not eliminate the
distinction between tenured and nontenured teachers, and would not
significantly hinder the school board in its efforts to maintain a
competent faculty.
Concerning the question of whether a protected interest is at
stake, it seems elementary that the nonretention of a professor will
have an adverse effect on his career. It also seems apparent from a
reading of the fourteenth amendment and past cases that all liberty
and property interests, no matter how minimal, are entitled to some
form of procedural due process protection. The balancing process is
utilized to determine what form of protection is required in each
case, and it is in this balancing that the degree of actual or probable
harm should be considered.
The majority requires that a teacher show, on a case-by-case
basis, that he has in fact been adversely affected by a nonretention
decision. Such a requirement will deny the educator his right to due
process protection prior to a deprivation of liberty or property in
many situations, because to show an adverse effect usually will require
one to wait until retention actually fails to occur. The procedural
protection formulated by the district court would have eliminated
an area of constitutional uncertainty by guaranteeing prior due process
in all teacher nonretention situations. This formulation should have
been adopted by the Supreme Court.
RUSSELL W. PETIT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT OF MARRIED HIGH SCHOOL
STUDENTS TO ENGAGE IN EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES.
In March 1970, the Board of Education of the Fremont City
Schools unanimously adopted a regulation, later amended and in-
cluded in its Policy Handbook, which permitted married students
to attend class but forbade them participation in school-sponsored
extracurricular activities. On January 22, 1972, Albert Davis, age 18,
married a 16-year-old girl who was allegedly carrying his child. Pursu-
ant to the adopted rule, Davis, an honor student, was removed from
the eligibility list for varsity baseball. Davis brought suit in United
66. 310 F. Supp. at 980.
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States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio seeking an order
restraining the board of education and school officials from excluding
him from the school's extracurricular activities and seeking damages.
Held: the effect of the enforcement of the regulations is to put an
unendurable strain upon the plaintiff's marriage and constitutes an
invasion of his marital privacy. Davis v. Meek, 344 F. Supp. 298 (N.D.
Ohio 1972).
Nancy Kay Holt, a high school senior, was suspended from school
for five days because of her marriage. Upon her return, she was al-
lowed to attend classes but was barred from participating in any extra-
curricular activities. Holt sought an injunction in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee prohibiting school
officials from enforcing the regulation against her. Held: the regulation
infringes upon the plaintiff's right to marry by limiting her right to an
education. Holt v. Shelton, 341 F. Supp. 821 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).
School boards have resorted to a variety of sanctions against mar-
ried students in order to discourage teenage marriages. These include
expulsion, suspension, and restriction on participation in extracur-
ricular activities. The justifications advanced by the boards for the
restrictions on extracurricular activities are fairly similar in all cases.1
First, it is asserted that married students may be a bad influence on
their fellow students. Thus, the boards attempt to minimize the
contacts between married and unmarried students by implementing
these sanctions. Secondly, the boards claim that married students
need extra time for family affairs. This implies that married students
cannot afford the time for extracurricular activities because it would
place an undue burden upon their marriages. Thirdly, the married
students' actions may gain acceptance by their peers. This is based on
the assumption that students will emulate successful students or ath-
letes. Lastly, the boards claim that married students assume adult-
hood and leave the less mature domain of student. However, this
denies one of the functions of education-the development of mature
adults. It cannot be assumed that because marriage is an adult insti-
tution that everyone who marries automatically becomes an adult. A
married student can derive the same benefits as an unmarried student
from extracurricular activities.
1. Cochrane v. Board of Educ., 360 MNich. 390, 103 N.W.2d 569 (1960) ex-
plicitly states the primary reasons usually advanced by boards of education to justify
the regulations.
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In the earlier cases involving these sanctions the courts rarely
reached the issue of the students' rights. They merely considered
whether school regulations were reasonable and were within the scope
of the-board's authority. The most extreme sanction employed by
some school boards was expulsion of the student. In McLeod v. State,2
the trustees of the public schools adopted an ordinance barring all
otherwise eligible married students from school attendance. In a
mandamus proceeding to compel the trustees to admit the plaintiff,
the court held that the ordinance was unreasonable, arbitrary and
void.3 The court considered marriage a "refining and elevating" insti-
tution, even though the participants were minors.4 A similar regula-
tion was also held unreasonable in another case decided in the same
year.5 However, in this latter case, moral turpitude on the part of the
married plaintiff was alleged by the board. Although accepting the
proposition that the constitutional and statutory right to attend school
was conditional upon reasonable moral standards, thus qualifying the
unreasonableness of expelling married students, the court held that
the evidence was insufficient to support the charge of immoral conduct
and the expulsion of the plaintiff.0  More recently, in Board of Educa-
tion of Harrodsburg v. Bentley,7 a school board regulation which pro-
vided for the expulsion of married students, subject to readmittance
after one year, was invalidated because of its "sweeping advance pre-
determination" that all married students must be suspended.8 The
court recognized that the board was vested with broad power and au-
thority to enforce reasonable rules and regulations. However, it found
no allegation of scandal, misbehavior or sensation-disruptions which
it believed necessary to support expulsion.9 The court in Harrodsburg
noted one case which supported that board's position.10 In that case,
the adopted rule required the expulsion of married students for the
2. 154 Miss. 468,122 So. 737 (1929).
3. Id. at 474, 122 So. at 739.
4. Id. at 473, 122 So. at 738.
5. Nutt v. Board of Educ., 128 Kan. 507, 278 P. 1065 (1929).
6. Id. at 508, 278 P. at 1066.
7. 383 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964); accord, Carrollton-Farmer's Branch Ind.
School Dist. v. Knight, 418 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (invalidating a three-
week suspension); Anderson v. Canyon Ind. School Dist., 412 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1967) (striking down a similar provision).
8. 383 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964).
9. The court also took judicial notice of the increasing demand for a high school
education. Id.
10. State ex rel. Thompson v. Marion Co. Bd. of Educ., 202 Tenn. 29, 302 S.W.2d
57 (1957).
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remainder of the current term because of the "serious problem con-
cerning marriage of high school students.""'  Great weight was ac-
corded the principal's expert testimony which concluded that the
presence of married students has an adverse effect on the efficient func-
tionifig of the school. As a result, the rule was held to have a reason-
able bearing on the efficiency and progress of the school, which the
board was statutorily empowered to promote. 2 However, the ma-
jority of the courts now hold that expulsion, or suspension for an
extended period, of married students is an unreasonable abuse of a
board of education's authority.
The validity of rules expelling unmarried pregnant students is a
related issue that has been considered by some courts. In one such
case,' 8 the plaintiff attacked a board regulation requiring pregnant stu-
dents to withdraw from school. The court found the primary purpose
of the regulation was to insure the physical well-being of the student.
It stated that the board could determine any adverse secondary effects
which pregnant students might have on the school. These effects are
impliedly the same as those which married students might create, but
it is not clear if they are sufficient, in themselves, to support expulsion.
However, the court did hold that the necessity for preserving the stu-
dent's bodily safety was sufficient grounds for suspension and that the
board did not exceed its discretionary powers in determining such
necessity.' 4
School boards have occasionally attempted to compel married
students to attend school. This policy illustrates the contradictory at-
titude of school boards toward married students. These cases arise
when school boards seek to enforce the compulsory school attendance
laws' 5 against "delinquent" or "truant" married minors. In one such
case,'1 the defendant sought to set aside a juvenile court judgment
committing her to reform school for "delinquency" and "truancy."
She claimed emancipation through marriage. In reversing the judg-
ment below, the court held that the defendant was no longer a "child"
11. Id. at 30, 302 S.W.2d at 58.
12. Id. at 32, 302 S.W.2d at 59.
13. State ex rel. Idle v. Chamberlain, 390 Ohio Op. 2d 262, 175 N.E.2d 539
(C.P., Butler County 1961).
14. Id. at 265, 175 N.E.2d at 542.
15. See, e.g., N.Y. EDuC. LAw § 3205(1) (a) (McKinney 1964) which provides:
"In each school district of the State, each minor from six to sixteen years of age shall
attend upon full time instruction."
16. State v. Priest, 210 La. 389, 27 So. 2d 173 (1946).
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since she was not under parental control and that her marital obliga-
tions were inconsistent with the compulsory school attendance law.
17
Similarly, in a suit involving the conviction of parents for causing the
delinquency of a child by participating in her illegal early marriage,
it was stated that a married child cannot be forced to attend school.18
In the case of In re Rogers, 9 the petition alleged that a married female
student was in need of supervision because of her truancy. The court
dismissed the petition by simply holding that the defendant was not
in need of supervision.20 However, there is some dispute as to whether
this case supports the proposition that married students cannot be
forced to attend school.2 '
A less extreme method of discouraging teenage marriages and
minimizing the contact between married and unmarried students is the
restriction of married students' participation in extracurricular ac-
tivities. State v. Stevenson22 involved the marriage of two 16-year-olds.
The board of education had adopted a "Code of Ethics" which pro-
hibited married students from engaging in extracurricular activities
at the school. In a mandamus proceeding, the plaintiff attacked the
regulation as unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. The court found
the board's action to be within the broad scope of its discretionary
powers.23 It noted the high dropout rate among married students
and the tendency of students to emulate the actions of peers perceived
17. Id. at 390-91, 27 So. 2d at 174. See also In re Goodwin, 214 La. 1062, 39
So. 2d 731 (1949) (married defendant arrested as a truant for refusing to attend school).
18. State v. Gans, 168 Ohio St. 174, 151 N.E.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 945 (1959). The court upheld the "causing delinquency" conviction by holding
that no actual delinquency need be proven, only that the acts would tend to cause
delinquency.
19. 36 Misc. 2d 680, 234 N.Y.S. 2d 172 (Family Ct., Schuyler County 1962).
20. Id. at 684, 234 N.Y.S.2d at 174. The court stated that the test for such cases
was a balancing of the advantages of school attendance against the harmful effects of
forcing married students to associate with fellow students. Id. at 682, 234 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
21. See Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate
Students Conduct and Status: A Non-Constitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 373,
409 n. 117 (1969). However, Professor Wade Newhouse has stated:
[T]he only decision of the court was that under the Family Court Act it did
not find respondent "a person in need of supervision." . . . [TI]he court was
simply exercising what it saw as its discretion to frame an appropriate order
under the Family Court Act without regard to the meaning of Section 3205
[New York's compulsory attendance law].
W. Newhouse, Law and Public Education in New York State, ch. IV, at 108, Fall 1972
(unpublished, preliminary ed. distributed only to students of The Faculty of Law and
Jurisprudence and The Faculty of Educational Studies, State University of New York
at Buffalo).
22. 27 Ohio Op. 2d 223, 189 N.E.2d 181 (C.P., Butler County 1962).
23. Id. at 225-26, 189 N.E.2d at 185.
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as "stars" or "heroes." 24 The court held that it was not an abuse of the
board's powers to discourage teenage marriages or to prevent over-
burdening those marriages. Furthermore, it stated that the plaintiff
had failed to sustain the burden of proof required to declare the regu-
lation unreasonable.2 5 In Kissick v. Garland Independent School Dis-
trict,26 the board of education adopted a resolution restricting married
students to the classroom and barring them from all athletics and
honors. The plaintiff sought an injunction against the board alleging
that the resolution was arbitrary, a denial of due process, and violative
of the equal protection clause and public policy, as well as the retro-
activity clause of the Texas Constitution.27 The plaintiff was antici-
pating a football scholarship to college. The court found that the pro-
hibition against retroactivity applied only to vested rights and that the
plaintiff's scholarship was only an expectancy or conditional right.28
Therefore, it was not a right subject to constitutional protection. The
court held that participation in extracurricular activities depended upon
reasonable conditions established by the board and that, in this case,
the resolution had a direct relation to a valid purpose.2 9 Facing an
identical situation, another court held the question moot because the
student had graduated. 0 However, in so holding, the majority be-
lieved that the reasons for the rule were insufficient and that the board
had acted unreasonably.31 In another attack on an extracurricular
activity restriction, the plaintiff in Starkey v. Board of Education 2 at-
tempted to expand the scope of the state constitutional requirement
that free, uniform schools shall be open to all children, to include
availability of extracurricular activities to all children. The court re-
fused to accept this broadened definition of education and held that
extracurricular activities are a privilege, participation in which is sub-
ject to regulation by the board.33 In response to a charge that a similar
24. Id.
25. Id. at 227, 189 N.E.2d at 186.
26. 330 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
27. TF A s CONST. art. I, § 16.
28. Kissick v. Garland Ind. School Dist., 330 S.W.2d 708, 711 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959).
29. Id. at 711-12.
30. Cochrane v. Board of Educ., 360 Mich. 390, 407, 103 N.W.2d 569, 583 (1960).
31. Id. at 336, 103 N.W.2d at 575.
32. 14Utah 2d 277, 381 P.2d 718 (1963).
33. Id. at 282, 381 P.2d at 721. The court attempted to clarify the matter by
stating that the plaintiff had a right to attend classes and to get married, but he had
no right to compel the board to exercise its discretion to his advantage. Id.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
exclusion rule violated equal protection, another court held that. the
board of education did not act unreasonably or abuse its powers by
enacting the rule. 4 It held that the married-unmarried classification
was not invidious discrimination which required a higher degree of
justification under the fourteenth amendment.835
The instant cases extend the scope of judicial review beyond the
standard of mere reasonableness of board action employed in the earlier
cases. The courts in Davis and Holt required a showing of a compelling
state interest to justify the infringement of the student's constitutional
rights. The Holt court relied on both Loving v. Virginia,0 which held
that marriage is a fundamental right, and Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,3 7 which held that an education is also a fundamental right. Recog-
nition of these rights as fundamental established the court's standard
of review under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. This standard is: any infringement by a state of a fundamental
right is "subject to the closest judicial scrutiny" and will be held im-
permissible unless necessary to promote a compelling state interest.88
The court stated that the evidence in Holt failed to show the promo-
motion of any state interest.8 9 It is indeed curious, in light of the
valid purpose of discouraging teenage marriages recognized by other
courts, that this court could not find any state interest. Instead, the
court determined that the sole purpose of the regulation was to punish
married students. Therefore, lacking a sufficient state interest, it held
that the regulation violated the plaintiff's right to due process and
equal protection. The weakness of the decision lies in its brevity and
its failure to give any weight to the state's policy of discouraging teen-
age marriages, recognized in other decisions. Certainly, some purpose
is served by these regulations, regardless of how minute. Yet, all the
emphasis is given to the fundamental rights of the students without
any counterbalancing weight. This approach distorts proper perspec-
tive of the opposing interests.
34. Board of Dir. of Ind. School Dist. of Waterloo v, Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 1265,
147 N.W.2d 854, 858 (1967).
35. Id. The court also stated that although marriage is favored by public policy,
it is so only at the proper age. Id. Accord, Estay v. LeFourche Parish School Bd., 230
So. 2d 443 (La. App. 1969) (holding participation in extracurricular activities within
the discretion of the board and valid if reasonable and uniformly applied within the
classifications created).
36. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. Holt v. Shelton, 341 F. Supp. 821, 822 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).
39. Id.
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On the other hand, the court in Davis found the state's purpose in
enacting the regulation to be "laudable."40 It stated:
[T]he plaintiff has acted wrongly, and the rules adopted by the de-
fendants are based upon a very reasonable desire to deal with a social
problein of great complexity and difficulty.-"
The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that he had a legal right
to marry as being based upon a misreading of Griswold v. Connecti-
cut,42 which places marital privacy, not the right to marry, "within the
penumbra of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. . ".."43 Al-
though the court refused the plaintiff's contention, it did recognize
that:
[T]he plaintiff did legally get married, without in doing so violating
any law of the state. He had thus attained a status where his marital
privacy might not be invaded by the state, even for the laudable
purpose of discouraging other children from doing what he did.4"
In addition, the court found that the rule was not even achieving its
purported purposes of discouraging teenage marriage and reducing
the resultant high dropout rate.45 It also concluded that, since Brown
v. Board of Education,46 extracurricular activities are "an integral and
complementary part of the total school program" 47 to which the plain-
tiff has a fundamental right. Finally, the court gave no weight to prior
state cases48 which upheld the validity of similar rules, since they were
decided prior to Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District.49 In that landmark decision, Mr. Justice Fortas
stated:
School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students.
Students in school as well as out of school are "persons" under our
40. Davis v. Meek, 344 F. Supp. 298, 302 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
41. Id. at 299.
42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
43. 344 F. Supp. at 299-300.
44. Id. at 300.
45. Id. at 300-01.
46. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. 344 F. Supp. at 301.
48. See, e.g., Cochrane v. Board of Educ., 360 Mich. 390, 103 N.W.2d 569 (1960);
Kissick v. Garland Ind. School Dist., 330 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
49. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The district court in Davis recognized:
[Tihere is no parallel between the problems of specific First Amendment
rights involved in that decision and the matter of . . marital privacy in-
volved here.
344 F. Supp. at 301.
However, the court accepted the dicta of Tinker as applicable here.
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Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the
State must respect.50
Relying upon this authority, the Davis court concluded that enforce-
ment of the board's regulation had the effect of placing "what may be
an unendurable strain upon the plaintiff's marriage." 1 It felt com-
pelled to grant a preliminary injunction to protect the plaintiff's mari-
tal privacy as well as his right to an education, pending a final hearing
of the case. 52
The Davis court weighted the opposing interests more realistically
than did the Holt court. However, in light of Tinker and Griswold,
it held that the state's interest was not sufficiently compelling to con-
travene the fundamental rights of the plaintiff. Furthermore, the
court found that the effect of the rule was to "punish the one who
has not been deterred at all"58 with the limited expectation of deterring
other students. Thus, "[w]ith real sorrow" 54 it struck down the rule.
Holt and Davis reflect the expanding contours of the rights of
students.55 The courts in the earlier state cases emphasized the broad
administrative discretion with which boards of education are endowed.
Thus, the rules were only required to meet a standard of reasonable-
ness in attaining a permissible state objective. Discouraging teenage
marriages was viewed as a permissible state objective, and restrictions
on extracurricular activities of married students was viewed as a reason-
able method of attaining that goal. However, the courts in the instant
cases recognized that these restrictions interferred with fundamental
rights of married students. Therefore, the standard of review shifted
to the necessiy that the action promote a compelling state interest. The
courts in Holt and Davis found the states' interest insufficient in com-
50. Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
The Davis court also cited Tinker:
Certainly where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the for-
bidden conduct would "materially and substantially interfere with the require-
ments of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school," the prohibition
cannot be sustained.
344 F. Supp. at 301.
51. 344 F. Supp. at 302.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. For other discussions of the rights of students, see Bolmeier, Board of Educa-
tion's Right to Regulate Married Students, 1 J. FAMILY L. 172 1961); Goldstein,
Reflections on Developing Trends in the Law of Student Rights, 118 U. PA. L. RaV. 612
(1970); Knowles, High Schools, Marriage, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 J.
FAMILY L. 711 (1972); Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 996 (1969).
642
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parison to the harm done to the students' rights to an education and to
marital privacy and accordingly struck down the restrictions.
Although adjudication of the instant cases at the district court
level may limit their precedential value, the ramifications of their hold-
ings are significant in several aspects. They reaffirm that students are
"persons" with constitutional rights, as first recognized in Tinker. In
addition, Davis and Holt extend the scope of those constitutional
rights into an area in which they were previously unrecognized by the
courts, that is, married students also have a right to marital privacy and
to a complete education, including extracurricular activities.
The instant cases also illustrate the diversity of opinions as to the
purpose of education and the function of the schools. Courts very
rarely engage in a discussion of a philosophy of education generally or
of the philosophy which is the basis for their decisions in school law
cases. The legal standards which are explicit in judicial determina-
tions are certainly important, but the court's implied perceptions of
the purposes of education and the functions of the schools are of deeper
and more far-reaching significance. The Davis court believed the
board's action was "laudable" but found itself constrained by consti-
tutional doctrine to strike down the regulation. Implied in its belief
is the assumption that the school boards may properly determine and
impose their conception of public policy and social values upon stu-
dents. Thus, the court assumed that one proper function of the schools
is the promotion of the socialization of the students, or in other words,
the promotion of uniform acceptance of perceived social standards by
the students; in this case social disapproval of early marriage. This
philosophy is reflected in many of the earlier state cases. However,
rather than relying strictly on constitutional doctrine to resolve the
conflict between school board authority and student rights, the courts
may find it more useful to reexamine their educational philosophy. No
one will dispute that the school can go to great lengths to discourage
overtly anti-social behavior in general. These measures implement
social values that society requires for its own protection. On the other
hand, the restrictions on married students reflect social preferences
that society does not require for its own protection and which boards
should have no authority to promote. These restrictions, in reality,
attempt to protect or deter unmarried students from tragic marriages
and from the increased probability that they will drop out of school
after marriage. Although the boards may view the rules as beneficial
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to the students, the students may perceive these rules as oppressive.
Therefore, the rules implement social preferences, not social absolutes,
and should not be under the control of the boards. Furthermore, the
restrictions on extracurricular activities, by definition, apply to students
already married and still in school. The Davis and Holt courts recog-
nized this paradox of punishing students after the fact of marriage but
questioned the means, not the ends, of the rules. Therefore, an alterna-
tive view of the function of schools in the socialization of students is
that the boards of education should implement only those social values
that directly affect the welfare of society and will prepare the student to
function in society.
Lastly, it is submitted that a more humane and useful approach
to the problem of teenage marriage may be for the schools to create
programs that will educate all students on the responsibilities of mar-
riage. This approach will not only attack the problem more directly
and efficiently but will also provide future guidance to the students
when they finally leave school.
CARL R. REYNOLDS
CRIMINAL LAW-FACULTY MEMBER ENTERING SCHOOL BUILDING
DURING TEACHERS STRIKE FOUND GUILTY OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS AND
RESISTING ARREST.
During the middle of October, 1968, New York City was in the
grips of its third teachers' strike in a month. Staged by the United
Federation of Teachers (UFT), this strike, which was later declared
illegal,' kept more than a million children out of public schools for
over a month. Like the two preceding walkouts, it was basically a re-
sult of the city's attempt to decentralize its schools. The city had made
several moves to set up experimental "demonstration" districts in
which a decentralization plan could be tested under set guidelines.
During this period deep and angry splits began developing among
whites, blacks, and Puerto Ricans over such issues as hiring, firing,
transferring, teacher accountability, minority principals, and expul-
sion of students. Frustrated by the state legislature's failing to back
1. See Rankin v. Shanker, 25 N.Y.2d 780, 250 N.E.2d 584, 303 N.Y.S.2d 527
(1969). For two versions of the events in New York City during this time, see B. CARTER,
PICKETS, PARENTS AND POWER (1971); M. MAYER, THE TEACHERS STRIKE (1969).
